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Magnitudo aesthetica, Aesthetic Greatness
Ethical aspects of Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Fragmen-
tary Aesthetica (1750/58)1
Dagmar Mirbach
Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten’s Aesthetica, which was published only 
in an incomplete form in the years 1750 and 1758, nonetheless offers, 
as I shall here argue, in its fragmentary form a systematically structured 
whole. It is based, as we all know, on his metaphysics, but in addition, as 
I will try to show, it is tightly linked to his ethics and his reflections on 
natural theology. But the internal coherence of the Aesthetica as a struc-
tured whole and the ethical and theological aspects of the work can only 
be recognized if one knows the entire text of the work. And that is pre-
cisely the problem: to have knowledge of the entire text of Baumgarten’s 
Aesthetica – which stretches over more than 600 pages in two octavo vol-
umes, containing in sum 904 sections, entirely in Latin, written in a quite 
complicated, or rather, grammatically sophisticated, hypotactical style. 
The fate of the Aesthetica, which is rightly and deservedly famous for be-
ing the work by which Baumgarten established aesthetics as its own, on-
tologically and epistemologically founded philosophical discipline, seems 
already to have been in the 18th century what it still seems to be today: 
the Aesthetica is famous, it is recognized to be of great importance in the 
history of philosophy as well as in respect to historical and systematic 
questions central to the development of aesthetic theory, the Aesthetica 
is regularly named and mentioned – but it has hardly ever, at least until 
some years ago, been read and studied in its entirety. For this reason, there 
are still many aspects of the Aesthetica, concerning the internal structure 
of the work and its theoretical content, as well as concerning its position 
in the history of philosophy and the history of aesthetics, which still have 
escaped our attention, but which are highly deserving of wider exposure 
and which must necessarily be made the subject of further investigation.
In the present essay I will concentrate on the underappreciated connec-
tion between aesthetics, ethics and – in this context more alluding to them 
than explicitly – theological reflections in Baumgarten’s Aesthetica. I will 
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try to do this in two steps. First I will provide an outline of Baumgarten’s 
project of aesthetics as such, focussing on its epistemological and (to a 
more limited degree) its ontological foundation. Secondly I will bring to 
light the often overlooked ethical aspect of the Aesthetica, introducing and 
interpreting a hitherto almost unread, but at the same time most exten-
sive chapter of the Aesthetica, namely, the chapter on aesthetic greatness 
(magnitudo aesthetica). This should, in the third place, also illuminate in 
a tentative way the close connection between aesthetics and theology in 
Baumgarten’s philosophy. But before I will discuss the main points at the 
heart of my contribution, I will need to preface them with a few words 
about Baumgarten himself and the fate of his Aesthetica, both in his time 
and since the 20th century.
Introduction: Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten and his Aesthetica
Baumgarten (born 1714) finished his studies in philosophy, theology, and 
philology at Halle in the year 1735. His studies had also comprised – and 
would continue to involve – a deep occupation with the writings of Leibniz 
and with the (at that time still forbidden) philosophy of Christian Wolff 
and his school. He completed his exams in February with a Disputatio In-
auguralis on the concepts of the high and the low in the Holy Scriptures,2 
followed in September of the same year by his professorial dissertation 
entitled Meditationes de nonnullis ad poema pertinentibus (On Some Condi-
tions of Poetry)3 which already contains the nucleus of his aesthetics. Having 
then worked for nearly five years as a lecturer at the University of Halle 
(the Academia Fridericiana), where he gave courses, inter alia, on the his-
tory of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, ethics, natural law, natural theology, 
and Hebrew, he obtained, in 1740, by an already 1739 pronounced order 
of King Friedrich Wilhelm I, a chair as full professor of philosophy at the 
University of Frankfurt an der Oder (the Academia Viadrina). Here he gave, 
even though with the years more and more prevented from teaching by 
serious illness, lectures on “all parts of philosophy”,4 on philology, natural 
law, social law, and Hebrew grammar. Furthermore, as can be proved by 
the lecture timetables of the Viadrina, he gave for the first time at a Ger-
man university lectures on aesthetics, starting in the winter term 1742/43. 
And he gave – something which until today has hardly been recognized in 
Baumgarten studies – at least one course on dogmatic theology. This course 
was published on the base of one of his student’s notes 11 years after Baum-
garten’s death in 1773 under the title Praelectiones philosophiae dogma-
ticae by Johann Salomo Semler,5 professor of theology in Halle, pupil and 
successor of the famous theologian Siegmund Jacob Baumgarten, the elder 
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brother and mentor of Alexander Gottlieb. Until his quite early death in 
1762, Baumgarten was not only a very popular professor, but also a remark-
ably successful philosophical author. Among his works, which ought to be 
mentioned besides his Aesthetica, is his very influential Metaphysica, which 
after its first edition in 1739 was republished another six times (7th edition 
1779),6 a fundamental philosophical textbook of altogether 1000 sections 
which was highly estimated and used for decades by Immanuel Kant and 
translated (in a shortened and modified version) into German in 1766.7 In 
addition, there are his Ethica philosophica, first published in 1740 and re-
published another two times (1751 and 1763), and his commentary on the 
logic of Christian Wolff, the Acroasis logica, published in 1761. It is well 
known that at many universities in Germany at the end of the 18th century 
Baumgarten’s works – primarily his metaphysics and his ethics – had been 
canonical academic textbooks. Regarding these publications, what I would 
like to emphasize here, without explaining it immediately (but I will work 
to demonstrate that below), is this: Baumgarten’s Aesthetica and his Ethica 
philosophica can be regarded as twin-sisters on the basis of Baumgarten’s 
Metaphysica (resting as it does on the four parts of metaphysical teaching 
established by Wolff, Ludwig Philipp Thümmig and Baumgarten, namely: 
ontology, cosmology, psychology and natural theology). But even though 
these three works are in fact tightly connected, Baumgarten’s Aesthetica 
could not join the public success of the Metaphysica and the Ethica philo-
sophica. There are two basic reasons for this exclusion. 
(1) Baumgarten’s Aesthetica remained, as already mentioned in the 
beginning, incomplete. Originally Baumgarten had planned a division 
and a combination of a theoretical and a practical section in the book. 
Of the theoretical aesthetics which was originally planned to have three 
parts – namely, heuristics (about the invention of beautiful thoughts), 
methodology (about their combination), and semiotics (about their forms 
of expression) – the published version of the Aesthetica contains only a 
fragment of the first part, the heuristics. And even in this part – which 
would altogether have dealt with six criteria of sensory (beautiful) cogni-
tion – abundance (ubertas), greatness (magnitudo), truth (veritas), light 
or brightness (lux), certitude or persuasion (certitudo/persuasio), and life 
or vivacity (vita) – only the first five are discussed. The missing discus-
sion of the sixth criterion (life) would have treated the effects of beautiful 
cognition and proposition (in the arts) on human affection and would 
therefore have been of great importance for the ethical aspect of the Aes-
thetica – a lack still bemoaned by Johann August Eberhard (one of Kant’s 
famous opponents) in 1790,8 who sought to establish, following Moses 
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Mendelssohn above all, an aesthetics based principally on a theory of hu-
man emotions (Empfindungen). Also missing entirely from the theoretical 
section of Baumgarten’s Aesthetica are the planned parts on methodology 
and semiotics – not to mention the entire section on practical aesthetics 
which Baumgarten could not even think of anymore in 1758.
(2) The second reason that Baumgarten’s Aesthetica did not attain a real 
public success has to do with the context of its publication. Consider the 
first volume of the Aesthetica of 1750 (the volume containing the discus-
sion of the first three criteria of sensory cognition, abundance, greatness, 
and truth within the heuristics). Already two years before it appeared, 
Georg Friedrich Meier, pupil of Baumgarten who in 1740 (from 1748 as a 
full professor) became his successor in Halle and a very busy and famous 
author in his own right,9 began to publish an extensive work on aesthetics 
himself which was explicitly founded on the manuscripts of Baumgarten, 
and was done with his full consent. The work, Meier’s Anfangsgründe 
aller schönen Wissenschaften, published in three volumes from 1748 
to 1750,10 not only contained all those parts and sections missing from 
Baum garten’s Aesthetica, but was furthermore written in the much more 
easily accessible German. The Anfangsgründe are not a mere transcription 
or translation of Baumgarten’s manuscripts, but rather Meier’s own adap-
tation of Baumgarten’s thought, carried out – in my opinion – in a highly 
popularised fashion, an adaption, which – again in my opinion – does not 
attain the same level of profound and sophisticated philosophical reflec-
tion as the fragmentary work of his teacher. At any rate, the fact that on 
the one hand Baumgarten’s Aesthetica was incomplete, written in a some-
times fastidious Latin and – notwithstanding the numerous quotations 
of classical authors – in a very concentrated, acroamatic,11 and almost 
esoteric style, whereas on the other hand Meier’s Anfangsgründe were 
exhaustive, written in German in a deliberately eloquent style, meant 
that from the very beginning it was Meier’s work which was more often 
read as the first systematic treatise on aesthetics – not Baumgarten’s. That 
nonetheless – insofar as e.g. Johann Gottfried Herder and (again) Kant 
are concerned – it were not Meier’s Anfangsgründe, but it was instead 
Baumgarten’s Aesthetica which had a deep impact on the following philo-
sophical discussion on aesthetics, was only brought to light much later by 
Baumgarten studies from the beginning of the 20th century onwards.
I just want to add that the fate of the Aesthetica in its modern editions 
has hitherto not been much better. The only editions of the entire Latin 
text have, until recently, been its edition in Italy by Tommaso Fiore and 
Alessandro Casati (in honour of Benedetto Croce, 1936)12 and a photo-
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mechanical reprint published in Germany (3rd edition 1986).13 A Ger-
man translation of the entire Aesthetica – in contrast to Italy, where we 
have two entire translations of the work by Francesco Piselli (1992) and 
Salva tore Tedesco (2000)14 – did not exist until 2007.15 Before that, only a 
translation of parts of the work by the honourable scholar Hans Rudolf 
Schweizer had been published in German – but, I have to add, even his 
extended translation covers only 234 of the altogether 903 sections of the 
Aesthetica.16 These are the passages containing Baumgarten’s prolegom-
ena, his specifications of the preconditions for the successful aesthetician 
(felix aestheticus) in the chapter on natural aesthetics (aesthetica natu-
ralis), some parts of the chapter on aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica), 
and some parts of the chapter on aesthetic light (lux aesthetica). Certainly 
these passages are essential for Baumgarten’s project of aesthetics, but 
they remain only parts – to the effect that, as I have mentioned in the 
beginning, the largest part of the Aesthetica, over 600 sections compris-
ing more than two thirds of the whole, still remained – at least in regard 
to research done in Germany – more or less unread, awaiting investiga-
tion. And it is these unread sections which include the chapter I intend to 
elaborate on in the second part of this essay, dealing with the criterion of 
aesthetic greatness. Before doing that and after these preceding necessary 
prefatory remarks I would like to give, in the first part, a short compacted 
outline of Baumgarten’s conception of aesthetics as such. 
1. Baumgarten’s project of aesthetics
Concentrating for now on Baumgarten’s own evolving definitions of aes-
thetics, I will firstly and primarily deal with its complex epistemological 
aspects. Already in the final passages of his early Meditationes from 1735 
Baumgarten provides it with a first definition (in §§ 115 and 116). Accord-
ing to the distinction the Greek philosophers and the Church Fathers had 
made between αijσϑητά [aisthetá] and νοητά [noetá], between objects 
of sense perception and objects of intellectual cognition, aesthetics – in 
contrast to logic, and acting as a supplement to it – is supposed to be con-
cerned with sensory things. In the first edition of his Metaphysica from 
1739 Baumgarten defines aesthetics to be the “science of sensory cogni-
tion and proposition” (scientia sensitive cognoscendi and proponendi, Met. 
§ 533), and in the second and third editions he adds, always in the same 
section, the further definition of aesthetics as the “logic of the lower fac-
ulty of cognition” (logica facultatis cognoscitivae inferioris). In the fourth 
edition of the Metaphysica he appends again four further determinations: 
Aesthetics is the “philosophy of the Graces and the Muses” (philosophia 
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gratiarum et musarum), it is a “lower theory of cognition” (gnoseologia 
inferior), an “art of beautiful thinking” (ars pulce cogitandi) and an “art of 
the analogon to reason” (ars analogi rationis). In § 1 of the Aesthetica of 
1750 the definition finally reads: Aesthetics, as “theory of the liberal arts, 
lower theory of cognition, art of beautiful thinking, art of the analogon to 
reason” (theoria liberalium artium, gnoseologia inferior, ars pulcre cogi-
tandi, ars analogy rationis) is the “science of sensory cognition” (scientia 
cognitionis sensitivae). All these determinations give us a clue to what 
Baumgarten conceives the new discipline of aesthetics to be: (1) Aesthet-
ics shall be a theory of cognition, namely a theory concerning the lower, 
sensory faculties of cognition; (2) it shall be, as a science, an equivalent 
supplement to logic; (3) it shall contain an explication of the beautiful; and 
finally (4) it shall serve as a theory of the arts. Note that Baumgarten does 
not merely list these elements as a happenstance collection, but rather 
conceives of them as fundamentally interdependent elements. It will be 
exactly this tight linking of a theory of cognition, a theory of the beautiful, 
and a theory of art (in this triad understood metaphysically as grounded 
in ontology and empirical psychology) which will trigger the philosophi-
cal debate over aesthetics in the second half of the 18th century.
The most provocative aspect of Baumgarten’s conception at the time 
(and it is on this that I wish to concentrate) is a double one: In the first 
place it is Baumgarten’s definition of aesthetics as a theory concerning the 
lower, sensory faculties of cognition (facultates cognoscitivae inferiores) 
which implies that there is sensory cognition as such. Secondly – and con-
sequently – it is his claim to understand aesthetics programmatically as an 
equivalent and autonomous supplementary science next to logic. This is a 
claim through which Baumgarten – applying the concept of a philosophia 
organica, connecting the entire spectrum of the human faculties of cogni-
tion – reacts to a suggestion which Georg Bernhard Bilfinger (a pupil of 
Wolff whose writings Baumgarten held in very high regard) had already 
made in 1725.17 The idea that aesthetics holds a position equivalent to 
logic and even has an analogous structure finds its roots in Baumgarten’s 
Metaphysica, and more precisely, in his empirical psychology.
According to Baumgarten’s empirical psychology in his Metaphysica the 
faculties of the human mind are subdivided into lower and higher (inferi-
ores, superiores) faculties of cognition (facultates cognoscitivae) and lower 
and higher faculties of appetition (facultates appetitivae; cf. Met. §§ 519–
732). For the higher faculties of cognition, intellect, and reason, there al-
ready was an organon or science since Aristotle: logic. What was still miss-
ing and what Bilfinger had demanded was a corresponding science for the 
Dagmar Mirbach
108
lower faculties of cognition, which include, following Baumgarten (cf. Met. 
§§ 534–623, Aesth. §§ 30–37), sense, imagination, sensory perspicacity, sen-
sory memory, the faculty of fiction (facultas fingendi), the sensory faculty 
to foresee, sensory judgement, sensory expectation, and the sensory knowl-
edge of signs (facultas characteristica sensitiva). The task of becoming the 
science of these lower faculties Baumgarten now assigns to aesthetics. And, 
given that all these sensory faculties (with the exception of sense, imagina-
tion, and the faculty of fiction) are to be regarded as analogous sensory 
counterparts to corresponding intellectual faculties, the equivalency be-
tween aesthetics and logic is founded in the structure of human cognitive 
faculties, and therefore in the human mind itself.
But Baumgarten still goes a step further: The sensory faculties of cog-
nition are not only analogous to the intellectual faculties (and therefore 
vouchsafe the position of aesthetics within epistemology, as having equal 
psychological footing with logic), but they are even basic (in the sense of 
being more at the bottom of inferior). To make, at first, a more formal point: 
In the empirical psychology of Baumgarten’s Metaphysica the lower, sen-
sory faculties of cognition are discussed chronologically first and at much 
greater length (in 104 sections) than the higher, intellectual faculties (dis-
cussed in only 26 sections). The same happens in Baumgarten’s outlines 
of a programme of philosophy, in the Sciagraphia encyclopaediae philo-
sophicae (from around 1740) and in the Philosophia generalis (also circa 
1740, both edited posthumously).18 And this same priority can be found 
in his programmatic inaugural lecture of 1740 at the Viadrina University 
in Frankfurt an der Oder:19 The science of sensory cognition, to be called 
aesthetics, always obtains the primary position before logic as the science 
of intellectual cognition within the framework of an exhaustive organic 
epistemology. Sensory cognition as well as the philosophical theory of 
sensory cognition are fundamental – as Baumgarten says in § 6 of the 
Aesthetica: “A philosopher is a human being among other human beings 
and he is doing wrong, if he holds the opinion that such a vast part of 
human cognition was not proper for him.”20 – I should mention here that 
Johann Gottfried Herder’s criticism of Baumgarten for characterizing aes-
thetics as sorella minoris of logic (cf. Aesth. § 13) is, at least in this point, 
not justified. Herder insinuates, that since the sensory faculties are more 
basic than the rational faculties of the soul, aesthetics should be referred 
to as the older sister of logic, not the other way round.21 But this is exactly 
what Baumgarten means: Regarding the structure of the human cognitive 
faculties, of course sensory cognition is fundamental and therefore to be 
understood as holding the first place, but, regarding the development of 
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philosophical sciences, aesthetics is, as a science which at the time still 
had to be established as such, much younger than logic.
And to make another point as regards content: Baumgarten takes over 
Leibniz’s theory of cognition, but with some crucial modifications. It is 
well known that, as a corrective to Descartes, Leibniz had distinguished 
– metaphorically speaking on an ascending scale – between dark, clear 
(clear-confused and clear-distinct), inadequate and adequate, symbolic 
and intuitive cognitions (paradigmatically in his early essay Meditationes 
de cognitione, veritate et ideis from 1684). Accordingly, for Leibniz a cog-
nition is dark, if an object is cognized, but not to the extent that one would 
be able to recognize it and distinguish it from other objects when one 
happens to cognize it another time. A cognition is confused, in his theory, 
if it suffices to enable us to recognize the object another time, but without 
being able to distinguish its single, particular predicates. As example of 
confused cognition he points to the cognitions we get from sense-percep-
tion: colours, odours, and tastes. A cognition is distinct, says Leibniz, if the 
necessary predicates of the object can be distinguished and be brought 
– following the principles of non-contradiction and of sufficient reason 
– into a so-called nominal definition (like the geometrical definition of a 
triangle or the scientific definition of gold). Due to the limited nature of 
our cognitive capacity (the malum metaphysicum), we as human beings 
can only arrive at distinct and (in mathematics) at nearly adequate cog-
nitions (where the single predicates of an object are further analyzed in 
regard to their composition). On Leibniz’s account, therefore, it remains 
the sole privilege of God to know everything and every single thing, not 
merely in its necessary predicates, but also in the infinity of its contingent 
and merely possible predicates in a fully adequate and at the same time 
intuitive cognition (simultaneously grasping all, both its variety and its 
unity in the same act).
Already in his 1735 Meditationes, Baumgarten inserts into this Leibniz-
ian scale a modification which is of far-reaching epistemological signifi-
cance for aesthetics: the clarity of a cognition can be aesthetically augment-
ed. Augmentation can take place in two ways, on Baumgarten’s account, 
one logical and one aesthetic. Within the logical domain, a clear and con-
fused cognition can be transformed into a distinct cognition by the determi-
nation and selection of the necessary predicates of the object. In this case its 
clarity is augmented intensively (leading to claritas intensiva). The task of 
augmenting the perfection of intensively clear distinct cognitions (which 
belong to the intellectual faculty of cognition) is to be performed by logic. 
But – and this is the essential modification – the clarity of a cognition can 
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also be augmented in an extensive way, if it can encompass – not distin-
guishing here between necessary and contingent features – a larger num-
ber of predicates of the object in question (which then means claritas 
extensiva).22 In this case the cognition still remains confused, but it is 
able to grasp its object over a wider range of predicates which the object 
– metaphysically and in the knowledge of God – really has (in the full 
sense of realitas, also including what is merely possible, not to be con-
fused with existentia as complement to possibility and defined as com-
possibility).23 Though, or better: exactly because these extensively clear 
confused cognitions always involve a rest of dark cognitions (or, in Leib-
nizian terminology: petits perceptions), they are the way in which every 
human mind,24 in the ground of the soul (fundus animae), reflects (in the 
sense of repraesentatio) the whole universe as if in a mirror.25 These cog-
nitions, then, are sensory cognitions and their perfection is the task of 
aesthetics. – Against the background of this concept of extensive clarity, 
we can easily understand that the first criterion of a perfect (and this is: 
beautiful) sensory cognition is its abundance (ubertas), the richness it 
contains of the predicates of its objects. And we can easily understand 
that the best objects for sensory cognition are not abstract items, but the 
most concrete, namely individual things which – following Leibniz’s 
doctrine of continuous determination (omnimoda determinatio) – have, 
in addition to their necess ary predicates, an infinite number of contin-
gent (as well as merely possible) predicates.
Again, keeping this epistemological concept of extensive clarity in 
mind, we can now also go into some ontological premises of Baumgarten’s 
aesthetics. According to Baumgarten’s ontology, every thing (ens) is tran-
scendentally one (unum, a unity, cf. Met. §§ 72f.); it is true (verum, truth be-
ing defined as the well-orderedness of predicates of a thing following the 
principles of non-contradiction and of sufficient reason, cf. Met. §§ 89f.); 
and it is perfect (perfectum, perfection being defined as the agreement of 
all different predicates of a thing constituting the sufficient reason of it, cf. 
Met. §§ 94f.).
As for truth (veritas), Baumgarten distinguishes different levels or as-
pects of truth. First of all there is metaphysical or objective truth (note: 
this is an ontological, not an epistemological concept). In the mind of God, 
where being and thinking are identical, everything – every entity (ens) 
– is metaphysically true, whereas we, as human beings, because of the 
restrictedness of our cognition (the malum metaphysicum), are not able to 
grasp this objective, metaphysical truth. Every truth that man can grasp is 
a subjective truth, in the sense that it is a restricted, subjective represen-
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tation of the things which in the mind of God really are. This subjective 
truth is, in its turn, either logical (i.e., regarding necessary predicates) or 
sensory/ aesthetic (i.e., regarding contingent predicates of the object in 
question). In the famous § 560 of his Aesthetica Baumgarten says: “What 
else is abstraction” – which is the procedural method of intellectual cogni-
tion, selecting necessary predicates from its object (i.e., the essentials and 
attributes founded in its essence) – “if not a loss?”26 Accordingly, from 
within our human subjective truth, if we are to reach a (relatively spo-
ken) maximum of objective, metaphysical truth, it will be necessary to 
combine logical and aesthetic truth, a combination for which Baumgarten 
coins the term “aestheticological truth” (veritas aestheticologica).27 It is 
worth dwelling shortly upon Baumgarten’s conclusion here, because it 
has far-reaching consequences for aesthetics. (1) If intellectual cognition 
concentrates on the necessary predicates of its objects, and (2) if sensory 
cognition is the way in which we can also grasp a part of the infinite abun-
dance of its contingent predicates, and (3) if moreover – by dint of our 
lower faculties of imagination and of fiction 28 – we can by sensory cogni-
tion also grasp a part of its merely possible predicates, then (4) sensory 
cognition – whether we are considering it for itself or its transposition 
into and its manifestation in works of art – can ultimately reveal aspects 
of the metaphysical truth which will always escape logical and scientific 
knowledge, but which nonetheless belong to the reality of things in the 
divine mind. Aesthetics, then, as the theory and science of sensory cogni-
tion, is rightly established as an organon or a philosophical instrument to 
broaden our cognition in regard to that which, in the eminent sense of the 
word, really is. And there is even a possibility that it – or at least parts of 
it – could be brought to existence in a work of art.
Before finally talking about the topic of aesthetic greatness, I should 
make a few remarks about the ramifications of Baumgarten’s concept of 
perfection (perfectio) in its relation to beauty. Beauty (pulcritudo) – be-
ing beautiful (pulcrum) – is no transcendental determination of a thing. 
Metaphysically and objectively speaking, a thing is perfect (perfectum), 
not beautiful. Or, to put it more forcefully, in God’s mind things are per-
fect, but not beautiful. At base, beauty is a phaenomenon of perfection, the 
appearance of transcendental perfection to the degree to which it can be 
grasped by the subjective cognition of the human mind. In §§ 18–20 of his 
Aesthetica Baumgarten clearly defines his concept of beauty as phaenom-
enon of metaphysical perfection; we must always distinguish between 
things as they really are metaphysically, in the mind of God, on the one 
hand, and as we cognize them, on the other. Beauty is (merely) a result of 
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the human cognitions of a thing, the order of these cognitions, and their 
expression for us (and in this we have the necessary connection between 
heuristics, methodology, and semiotics in aesthetics). Beauty is only and 
can only be this phaenomenon – the appearance of metaphysical, objec-
tive perfection, as it is realized (in the sense of cognoscere) and expressed 
(in the sense of proponere) by the subjective human mind.29 Therefore 
those definitions of beauty which, because of their seeming inconsistency 
or even contrariness, had formerly attracted so much attention in Baum-
garten studies (namely, Met. § 662 and Aesth. § 14) are not contradictory at 
all, but congruent: Beauty is, as Metaphysica § 662 says, the perfection of 
the phaenomenon (perfectio phaenomenon), that is, it is the metaphysical 
perfection of the object as it appears to human cognition, and at the same 
time it is, as Aesthetica § 14 says, the perfection of sensory cognition (per-
fectio cognitionis sensitivae), because it is also fundamentally dependent 
on the sensory faculties of the subject, their disposition, and their educa-
tion, in the subjective human mind. 
2. Aesthetic greatness (magnitudo aesthetica)
Having thrown, as I hope, a little light on Baumgarten’s project and the 
epistemological and ontological premises of his aesthetics, I can now more 
efficiently present my second and main point which deals with the ethical 
aspects of Baumgarten’s Aesthetics. The strong relations between Baum-
garten’s aesthetics and his ethics (and to the context of natural theology as 
well) can best be shown by means of an investigation of the second – and 
largest – chapter of the Aesthetica on aesthetic greatness (magnitudo aes-
thetica, §§ 177–422), situated between the chapter on aesthetic abundance 
(ubertas aesthetica) and aesthetic truth (veritas aesthetica). But the topic 
of aesthetic greatness is in effect not at all restricted to this chapter on the 
magnitudo aesthetica; we already encounter the prerequisites for it in the 
very beginning of the text. The far-reaching consequences of this concept 
work in a way which Baumgarten studies until now have almost always 
overlooked, and concern the significance of the Aesthetica as a whole.
I will now introduce and develop three arguments: (1) Aesthetic great-
ness is, in the first place, linked to Baumgarten’s conception of the suc-
cessful aesthetician and the demands he not only makes on the cogni-
tive faculties, but also on the appetitive faculties of the felix aestheticus, 
introduced in the first chapters of the Aesthetica. (2) Aesthetic greatness 
is, secondly, as claim to the appetitive faculties, in a complementary way 
linked to the concept of aesthetic abundance, discussed in the preceding 
chapter (§§ 115–176), as claim to the cognitive faculties. (3) And, thirdly, 
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aesthetic abundance and aesthetic greatness are, in their complementary 
coupling, tightly linked to and founded in the concepts of the Kingdom 
of Nature (regnum naturae) and the Kingdom of Mercy (regnum gratiae) 
of the Leibnizian theodicy. A careful investigation of Baumgarten’s con-
cept of aesthetic greatness reveals that his aesthetics involves (besides 
an ontologically founded concept of beauty) not only an epistemological 
theory of cognition, but also a moral theory of right action, both of which 
necessarily belong together; likewise – but I will only allude to that in this 
essay – such an examination of aesthetic greatness can reveal the close 
connection of his aesthetics and theological reflections.
In chapter II of the Aesthetica, on natural aesthetics (aesthetica natu-
ralis, §§ 28–46), Baumgarten discusses the demands on the “natural dis-
position of the entire mind to think beautifully” (dispositio naturalis 
animae totius ad pulcre cogitandum) of the felix aestheticus, “with which 
he is born” (quacum nascitur, § 28). The first necessary precondition to 
become a successful aesthetician is an “innate graceful and elegant spirit” 
(ingenium venustum et elegans connatum, § 29). To this belong the lower 
faculties of cognition as well as the higher, rational faculties, intellect and 
reason, which for their part guarantee the “dominion of the soul over 
itself” (animae in semet ipsam imperium, Met. § 730) and the harmony 
(consensus) of the lower faculties. In the “graceful and elegant spirit” the 
higher and lower faculties of cognition must work together harmonically 
(§ 38). But there is also a second demand on the natural disposition of 
the felix aestheticus: the demand for a specific condition of his appeti-
tive faculties, of his character (indoles), which Baumgarten names “the 
inborn aesthetic temperament” (temperamentum aestheticum connatum, 
§ 44) and which he first very briefly defines as the will to follow a “digni-
fied and moving cognition” (cognitio digna et movens). In the following 
§ 45 of the Aesthetica Baumgarten enumerates, in an ascending scale of 
values, the things to which the felix aestheticus should orient his appeti-
tive faculties: Affluence, power, work, leisure, external delights, freedom, 
honour, friendship, healthiness, “beautiful cognition and its supplement, 
kind virtue” (cognitio pulcra cum suo corrolario virtute amabili), “higher 
cognition and its supplement, venerable virtue” (cognitio superior cum 
suo corrolario virtute venerandi). The section closes as follows: 
Altogether it will be allowed to assign to aesthetic characters a certain innate 
greatness of the heart, an excellent instinct to strive for great things, especially 
in those characters who keep attention to how easy the transition is from here 
to the absolutely greatest things.30
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From the context of this section and from the references Baumgarten 
makes to preceding sections and to respective sections in the empirical 
psychology of his Metaphysica, we can find out what is meant by this 
“greatness of the heart” and “excellent instinct to strive for great things”: 
It is the striving for moral greatness, understood as liberal orientation of 
the appetitive faculties to the morally good – given that freedom is in its 
first and basic meaning defined as the dominion of the mind over itself,31 
where sensory desires and rational motives work together har moniously. 
In the demand for “greatness of the heart” and “excellent instinct to strive 
for great things” which in the felix aestheticus necessarily must go togeth-
er with a “graceful and elegant mind”, the concept of aesthetic greatness 
is already implicitly introduced in the very beginning of the Aesthetica. 
Furthermore, Baumgarten, as we have just seen, also says that moral 
greatness – striving for the morally good – is the precondition for the 
“transition” to “the absolutely greatest things”; the question of just what 
he intends to say with this remark will be solved, as I will argue below, in 
the chapter on aesthetic greatness itself.
In the chapter on aesthetic greatness, Baumgarten distinguishes sys-
tematically between the greatness of the object which is thought (magni-
tudo materiae, §§ 191–216), the greatness of the way of thinking according 
to the respective greatness of its objects (ratio cogitationum, §§ 217–328), 
and finally the greatness of the subject who thinks (magnitudo personae, 
§§ 352–422). Utilizing the classical rhetorical differentiation between 
three types of speaking (genera dicendi), he additionally distinguishes, 
not only in the passages on the ratio cogitationum but in all three aspects, 
three different levels: a simple (tenue), a medium, and the sublime level. 
Not being able to unfold within the limited space of this essay the whole 
sophisticated architecture of these different aspects and levels of aesthet-
ic greatness altogether, I will instead concentrate on the main point of 
the chapter in question, namely, the aesthetic greatness of the subject or 
person, also called by Baumgarten aesthetic dignity (dignitas aesthetica, 
§ 182), and here again I will concentrate on this subjective greatness of 
the person at its highest level – the highest, sublime greatness of mind or 
greatest magnanimity within the aesthetic dominion (magnanimitas in 
aestheticis genere maxima, §§ 394–422).
Baumgarten works out his concept of greatest aesthetic magnanim-
ity in two steps. He carries out the first step not through an argumenta-
tive reflection, but rather by means of the rich fund of metaphors and of 
quotations from antique Roman poetry and rhetoric, describing it as an 
orien tation or approach to the divine, as a rise or ascent “to the heavenly 
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things” (quote from one of Baumgarten’s students).32 He carries out the 
second step through a discussion of Longinus’s concept of magnanimity 
(μεγαλοψυχία [megalopsychía]) from Longinus’s treatise On the Sublime 
(Περί u{ψους [Perí hýpsous]), particularly insofar as Longinus holds that 
one of the most necessary preconditions for magnanimity is freedom. It 
is only in this second step (with additional support from references to cor-
responding sections in the Metaphysica and the Ethica philosophica) that 
Baumgarten’s initial literary description of the greatest magnanimity as 
an approach to the divine receives its theoretical foundation.
Let us have a look at the first step. Already in § 394 “aesthetic magna-
nimity in its most excellent meaning” (magnanimitas aesthetica per emi-
nentiam sic dicta) is ascribed to a “higher spirit” (superius ingenium) and a 
“heart which is born for immortality and already lives this immorality in its 
mortal body” (immortalitati natum vivensque mortali iam in corpore pectus), 
to a mind which therefore, with Vergil,
with amazement admires the threshold of the Olympus
and sees right under its feet the clouds and the stars.33
Often – Baumgarten continues with another quotation of Vergil – such a 
spirit and such a heart
will receive the life of the Gods, will see in the midst of them
heroes, and will itself be seen by them.34
The rule of such an excellent or, as Baumgarten adds, sublime magnanim-
ity is then (in § 399) determined to be a respect for the divine and the sub-
mission of all human affairs to it. Baumgarten emphasizes this point by a 
reference to an earlier quotation (in § 206) from De natura deorum where 
Cicero holds that every great man, if he is virtuous and rightly honours 
the Gods, will always be “surrounded by a divine breath”.35 In § 403 Baum-
garten himself provides a description of sublime magnanimity, inserting 
into it a quotation from Horace:
Although a mind which has enough greatness for sublime things is not the one 
of the wise stoic, who,
  if the universe crashes down shattered,
  keeps intrepid in face of the smashing wreckage,
it will nonetheless never be tormented by minor troubles nor will it be deprived 
of its calm serenity which emulates the life of the Gods.36
In § 404, finally, Baumgarten gives another very poetic, nearly pathetic 
description of a noble mind endowed with sublime magnanimity:
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 If such a noble mind really wants to approach strenuously to things, which 
have to be thought as being greater, it must, as if it had forgotten itself and its 
ordinary state, be excited and so to speak be torn off to a higher theatre than 
the one on which it is playing its role day-to-day, it must in such a way be united 
with the Gods and the heroes, that it seems that it had found a certain heavenly 
acquaintance with them, not as if it had been expelled to a foreign country, but 
as if it had been at home in such a community already for a long time, §§ 213, 
396.37
The references that are given at the end of this passage to § 213, where 
Baumgarten had illustrated with a quotation from Vergil that only a small 
number of men “who were kindly loved by Jove, whose virtue fervently 
carried them up to ether, sons of the Gods”,38 are able to achieve heroic 
virtue and a way of life with the hallmark of majestic greatness, and to 
§ 396, where he had cited from Horace that “virtue for those, who do not 
deserve to die, opens heaven’s door”,39 serve to emphasize what is meant 
by all these descriptions: The greatest magnanimity, the highest form of 
moral greatness, is nothing less than the nearest possible approach, the 
nearest possible community with the divine.
In the second part of the chapter on aesthetic greatness Baumgarten 
finally elaborates the theoretical foundation of his definition of the mag-
nanimitas in aestheticis genere maxima in the discussion of Longinus, 
namely the last segments of Περί u{ψους (Perí hýpsous).
At the end of that fragmentary treatise Longinus investigates, by means 
of an imaginary dialogue with another (unnamed) philosopher, the ques-
tion why at that time (probably the first half of the first century A. D.) 
there were only such a small number of sublime spirits capable of sub-
lime enthusiasm and magnanimity. Against the opinion of the anony-
mous philosopher, Longinus contends that the reason for this paucity is 
not to be found in external circumstances, in the political despotism of 
the Roman Empire, but rather in the inward or mental despotism and 
the endless war of our desires and passions which lead to vice and to the 
decline of moral standards, a situation in which every magnanimity is 
necessarily bound to fade away.40 At this point Baumgarten takes up the 
Longinian discourse with the following argument which deserves to be 
quoted at length (§ 414):
If the bridles of external freedom, if external slavery is mostly made for depress-
ing men’s spirits and to smash down without any difference all their greatest 
efforts and any great enthusiasm – which I do not deny – then it does not seem 
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to me erroneous (because contrary things have contrary reasons), if I regard as 
one of the primary means of assistance for our spirits in order to raise to the 
really sublime the intimate persuasion of the abundant system of the greatest 
events, not only events of the past and of the present time, but also and to the 
largest extent of events that will happen in the future; the system that not only 
shows us the best and the greatest examples of the sublime and of venerable 
virtue which can easily be emulated, but which also administers us, with most 
obvious rules, the most salutary means to bring forth the dominion about our-
selves, to escape all inward slavery and to maintain the victory over ourselves. 
The persuasion, I say, of those things which really have been done and still are 
to be done, the persuasion which at the same time by divine providence endows 
men’s spirits with such power and such faculties, that not even the fear of death 
could force them to do something what an unjust tyrant would like them to do: 
This sensory persuasion is the supernatural complement and supplement to 
one’s inward and psychological freedom.41
Baumgarten can only agree with Longinus’s argument that the absolutely 
necessary precondition for magnanimity is not to be seen in an exter-
nal freedom from political despotism, but in the inward freedom from 
the despotism of intemperate desires and passions. For Baumgarten, too, 
freedom primarily consists – as we have just heard – in the freedom from 
inward moral slavery, a freedom which can be attained in the dominion 
of the mind over itself which guarantees that sensory passions, too, are 
ultimately guided by the higher appetitive faculties (voluntas, noluntas) 
according to motives of rational cognition. More interesting, however, 
and of great significance for Baumgarten’s concept of magnanimity, is his 
interpretation of the relationship between inward and external freedom 
which underlies the argument of the section just quoted. Three points are 
especially pertinent here.
(1) Baumgarten does not deny that limitations of external freedom can 
be a hindrance for magnanimity. If Longinus’s anonymous philosopher 
holds that external slavery as a reason has the prevention of magnanimity 
as its consequence, then the reverse of this must equally be true: magna-
nimity as a consequence has its reason in external freedom.
(2) Now – and this is the crucial point in Baumgarten’s argument – 
though this external freedom can physically be prevented by contingent 
historical, political, or social circumstances, from a metaphysical point of 
view, however, it is always and steadfastly guaranteed by the “abundant 
system of the greatest events” (copiosum maximorum eventuum systema) 
resting in the divine choice to establish the best of all possible worlds. 
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Owing to this system, in which all past, present, and future events are ar-
ranged in the best possible way, the human mind is in fact, as Baumgarten 
says in § 729 of his Metaphysica, totally independent 42 from all contin-
gent, finite circumstances in this world. In this sense the human mind is 
– within and against all physical restrictions – metaphysically free.
(3) The “intimate persuasion” which is by definition not an intellec-
tual conviction but a sensory certitude43 of the divine establishment of 
the “abundant system of the greatest events” is, as Baumgarten says, the 
“supernatural complement and supplement to one’s inward and psy-
chological freedom” (supernaturale libertatis internae complementum ac 
supplementum). Therefore, if we take the term complementum in its full 
Wolffian sense (as Baumgarten does), this “intimate persuasion” is the in-
dispensible precondition for the realization of the inward, psychological 
freedom in terms of the imperium animae in semet ipsam. And as this do-
minion of the mind over itself is in its turn the precondition for morality 
and moral acting, sensory certitude (not an intellectual conviction) of the 
divine establishment of the best of all possible worlds is itself a necess-
ary condition for moral greatness as willingness to act accordingly to the 
morally good. Only both together, the inward, psychological freedom as 
dominion of the mind over itself and its precondition, the intimate sen-
sory persuasion that God created this world as the best of all possible 
worlds – only both together comprise the greatest, sublime magnanimity, 
the magnanimitas in aestheticis genere maxima.
I want to make a final remark on an interesting reference that Baumgarten 
makes precisely in this context to his Ethica philosophica (1740). In § 416 
of his Aesthetica, following closely to the section just discussed, he defines 
the state of sublime magnanimity as well as state of tranquillity (status 
tranquillitatis). With reference to the Ethica he furthermore defines it – 
not surprisingly – as the state of the virtuous man (status virtuosi). But let 
us have a closer look at the passage in the Ethica which Baumgarten refers 
to. There, in § 443, he says:
[I]n a person, in whom is such an amount [of cognition] as is demanded by the 
state of virtue – in abundance, greatness, truth, clarity, certitude and vivacity – 
in this person reigns the state of light, or the moral dominion of light; a person, 
in whom isn’t such an amount of cognition, is in the state of darkness, in the 
moral dominion of darkness.44
And he continues in § 444:
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A man, even a most rational man, who enjoys a rich, exact, great, vivid and also 
even distinct cognition of morality of a kind which is even near to [rational – 
D. M.] conviction or demonstration, can nonetheless be in the state of darkness. 
Only the virtuous man is in the state of light. But the duty of the virtuous man 
is also to extend the realm of the dominion of light and to act in accordance with 
the light itself; this means to walk in the light as much as one is able to.45
Two points need to be made here. The first regards an obvious allusion 
to Leibniz. With the metaphor of the “moral dominion of light” (regnum 
lucis morale) Baumgarten refers to Leibniz’s Kingdom of Mercy (regnum 
gratiae), a concept he explicitly names in the introduction to the second 
edition of his Metaphysica (1742).46 If we follow Leibniz, God has estab-
lished this world on the one hand as a Kingdom of Nature, in which there 
is the greatest possible variety of things and their determinations in unity, 
and on the other hand and at the same time God has established this world 
as a Kingdom of Mercy, in which everything “will turn out to be the best” 
for rational and morally good beings.47 Without going into more details in 
the context of this essay now, my argument is the following: It does not 
seem far off, in my opinion, to find in these two complementary Leibnizian 
concepts the principles which structure, concerning their mutual related-
ness and concerning their argumentative contents, the first two chapters of 
Baumgarten’s Aesthetica – namely the chapter on aesthetic abundance and 
the chapter on aesthetic greatness.
We can finally see that these two concepts already underlie Baum-
garten’s discussion of the successful aesthetician. The demands on the 
felix aestheticus in chapter II of the Aesthetica on natural aesthetics were 
the demand for a “graceful and elegant spirit” and the demand for a “great-
ness of the heart”. The “graceful and elegant spirit” concerns the cognitive 
faculties of the felix aestheticus, and corresponds to the first criterion of 
sensory cognition, being aesthetic abundance (ubertas aesthetica) with 
the claim that aesthetic cognition must grasp its objects in the greatest 
possible variety of their predicates, in accordance, on the level of the re-
stricted subjective human cognition, to the greatest possible variety of 
the things in the world – the Kingdom of Nature. The “greatness of the 
heart”, on the other hand, concerns the appetitive faculties of the felix 
aestheticus, to which then corresponds the second criterion of sensory 
cognition, namely aesthetic greatness (magnitudo aesthetica), the highest 
subjective form being sublime magnanimity. Sublime magnanimity itself 
turned out to be a community of the virtuous man with the divine – or, 
as we can now say, a state which shows the virtuous man to be a member 
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of the Kingdom of Grace. The theological background, here in terms of 
Leibniz’s metaphysics and of natural theology, of Baumgarten’s ethical 
demands on the aesthetician and on aesthetics as such is worth further 
investigation. In my opinion it is not wrong to call Leibniz the last “great 
Christian metaphysician”.48 And I think that it is not wrong either to call 
Baumgarten the first philosopher who transforms this Christian meta-
physics into an aesthetic theory.
And to finally conclude with the second point: If we take seriously the 
connection of aesthetic magnanimity to the Ethica philosophica, where 
Baumgarten insists on the demand that we do not only have to cognize 
what is morally good, but that we also have to act in accord with this cog-
nition in order to extend the realm of the Dominion of Light, then works 
of art, too – as sensory reflections not only of man’s cognitive faculties, 
but also of his appetitive faculties and his possibilities to strive for the 
good – can contribute not merely to our knowledge of the world, but also 
reveal where our actions should finally lead to.
God reveals himself to us in the perfection, the utmost variety in unity, 
of the world, in the Kingdom of Nature, and he reveals himself in the con-
stitution of this world which is such that everything turns out to be the 
best for morally good persons in the Kingdom of Grace. Man can come 
near to God by striving for the perfection not only of his cognitive, but also 
of his appetitive faculties. In this last point I believe there is (especially in 
the chapter on aesthetic greatness) a fundamental ethical and theological 
meaning for aesthetics as theory of sensory cognition. This ethical and 
theological import of aesthetics for Baumgarten has hitherto not been real-
ized to the extent it deserves. But it opens up a new horizon for the under-
standing and the evaluation of the complexity of Baum garten’s aesthetic 
theory in the history of aesthetics.
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